Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle

B. Douglas Bernheim, Sergei Severinov

Journal of Political Economy · 2003 · 149 citations · 22 references

Concepts

TL;DR

In the United States, more than two‑thirds of multichild decedents divide their estates equally among their children, whereas gifts given before death are usually unequal. The authors aim to explain the equal division puzzle by proposing a theory that treats bequest division as a signal of parental altruistic preferences. The theory models bequest division as a signaling mechanism that conveys parental altruistic preferences to heirs. The theory challenges existing explanations of intergenerational transfers and also accounts for the norm of unigeniture observed in other societies.

Abstract

In the United States, more than two‐thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children. In contrast, gifts given before death are usually unequal. These findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers. In this paper, we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent's altruistic preferences. The theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture, which prevails in other societies.

References

22