eYLS (Yale Law School) · 2009 · 20 citations · 22 references
Open access
Public AffairsPublic PolicyRegulatory PolicyFood SafetyRegulatory GovernanceTransnational GovernanceFood Safety LawFood Safety PolicyImport RegulationInternational Food TradeRegulationRegulatory AgenciesCross-border Food RegulationFood Safety GovernanceFood Safety IncentivesFood Safety TransparencyImport Safety ControlsInternational Food GovernanceLong-term EffectivenessStandard-setting Processes
Published as Chapter 12 in Import Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global Economy, Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel & David Zaring, eds.\nThis paper examines the role of ‘private’ (non-governmental) regulatory programs in assuring the safety of imported products. Focusing particularly on food safety it argues that private regulatory institutions have great capacity to control safety hazards and to implement dynamic systems for detecting and correcting nascent risks. However, to establish the accountability and legitimacy relationships necessary for long-term effectiveness, private safety regulatory programs must devise new ways of incorporating and responding to the interests of developing country producers, laborers, consumers, and governments. Developed country regulators can aid this process by ‘orchestrating’ transnational governance processes to ensure that private regulatory programs collect and share information, maximize transparency and participation in their standard setting procedures, and experience incentives to deploy maximal care in implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.
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THE WELFARE COSTS OF TARIFFS, MONOPOLIES, AND THEFT
Gordon Tullock · Economic Inquiry · 1967 · 2.9K citations
Accountability in the Regulatory State
Colin Scott · Journal of Law and Society · 2000 · 624 citations
Social Sciences, Public Administration, Public Management +17