Zero-sum Bayesian Games

Zero-Sum Bayesian Games is a game-theoretic model in which two strategic agents with incomplete information about each other's payoffs engage in a competitive interaction where the sum of their expected utilities is always zero, distinguishing it from general Bayesian games by enforcing strict adversariality under uncertainty.

26

Publications

7.2K

Citations

58

Authors

31

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

5

Authors

58

  1. EH
    Edward Hughes

    Google (United States), United States

    2 publications · 92 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. MB
    Michael Bowling

    University of Alberta, Canada

    2 publications · 92 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. NB
    Neil Burch

    University of Alberta, Canada

    2 publications · 92 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SD
    Shaddin Dughmi

    University of Southern California, United States

    2 publications · 52 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. JF
    Jakob Foerster

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 92 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 58

Venues

  1. 2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)

    Conference · 2 publications · 48 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. arXiv (Cornell University)

    Repository · 2 publications · 63 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Management Science

    2 publications · 991 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. International Journal of Game Theory

    2 publications · 59 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 1 publications · 22 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5