Veto Player Effects

Veto Player Effects is a theoretical framework in political science that explains policy outcomes as a function of the number and ideological positions of institutional actors whose agreement is necessary for legislative change, distinguishing it from alternative models by emphasizing strategic anticipation of veto points in agenda-setting processes.

131

Publications

14.5K

Citations

176

Authors

137

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

24

Authors

176

  1. GT
    George Tsebelis

    University of California, Los Angeles, United States

    9 publications · 7.5K citations

    9

    h-index

  2. HV
    Helen V. Milner

    Princeton University, United States

    3 publications · 418 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. PK
    Philip Keefer

    Inter-American Development Bank, United States

    3 publications · 725 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. ED
    Edward D. Mansfield

    University of Pennsylvania, United States

    3 publications · 418 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. SN
    Salvatore Nunnari

    Bocconi University, Italy

    3 publications · 61 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 176

Venues

  1. West European Politics

    WEP · 7 publications · 394 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 6 publications · 127 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. Comparative Political Studies

    CPS · 6 publications · 675 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. European Journal of Political Research

    5 publications · 414 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. Journal of Theoretical Politics

    JTP · 4 publications · 258 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5