Unilateral Effects

Unilateral Effects is a theory of competitive harm in merger analysis whereby a merger is presumed to lead to a significant lessening of competition because the merged entity, acting independently, would have both the incentive and ability to profitably raise prices or reduce output unilaterally in a relevant market without coordination with other firms.

62

Publications

2.7K

Citations

94

Authors

64

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

14

Authors

94

  1. CS
    Carl Shapiro

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    4 publications · 516 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. VN
    Volker Nocke

    University of Mannheim, Germany

    3 publications · 128 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. MB
    Malcolm B. Coate

    Federal Trade Commission, United States

    3 publications · 50 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. GJ
    Gregory J. Werden

    United States Department of Justice, United States

    3 publications · 110 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. SM
    Serge Moresi

    Georgetown University, United States

    3 publications · 180 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 94

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 12 publications · 511 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. Review of Industrial Organization

    RIO · 4 publications · 109 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. Economics Letters

    3 publications · 158 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 2 publications · 29 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. National Bureau of Economic Research

    Repository · 2 publications · 37 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5