Unilateral Effects
Unilateral Effects is a theory of competitive harm in merger analysis whereby a merger is presumed to lead to a significant lessening of competition because the merged entity, acting independently, would have both the incentive and ability to profitably raise prices or reduce output unilaterally in a relevant market without coordination with other firms.
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2.7K
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94
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64
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2017–2026
14
Variants
Non-coordinated Effects
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62
Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?
George Bittlingmayer · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1985 · 144 citations · Full text
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Georgetown University
Washington, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
164 citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
3 h-index
6 publications
990 citations
University of Mannheim
Mannheim, Germany
3 h-index
4 publications
141 citations

Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Lisbon, Portugal
3 h-index
3 publications
147 citations

Charles River Associates
Boston, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
180 citations
Federal Reserve
Washington D.C., United States
2 h-index
2 publications
29 citations
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Washington D.C., United States
2 h-index
2 publications
29 citations

United States Department of Justice
Washington, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
99 citations
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Repository · 12 publications · 511 citations
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RIO · 4 publications · 109 citations
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3 publications · 158 citations
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Repository · 2 publications · 29 citations
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Repository · 2 publications · 37 citations
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