Two-party Equilibrium

Two-Party Equilibrium is a political equilibrium model in which two competing parties, under the assumptions of the Median Voter Theorem, converge to adopt identical policy positions at the median voter’s ideal point to maximize electoral support in a unidimensional policy space.

138

Publications

24K

Citations

189

Authors

99

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

11

Authors

189

  1. BG
    Bernard Grofman

    University of California, Irvine, United States

    4 publications · 195 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. SC
    Steven Callander

    Stanford University, United States

    4 publications · 274 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. SM
    Samuel Merrill

    Wilkes University, United States

    4 publications · 201 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. JM
    James M. Snyder

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    4 publications · 499 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. JE
    John E. Roemer

    Yale University, United States

    4 publications · 331 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5 of 189

Venues

  1. Journal of Theoretical Politics

    JTP · 7 publications · 253 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. American Journal of Political Science

    AJPS · 6 publications · 473 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. American Political Science Review

    6 publications · 864 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. Journal of Public Economic Theory

    6 publications · 93 citations

    6

    h-index

  5. American Economic Review

    5 publications · 1.2K citations

    5

    h-index

1–5