Tie-breaking Rules

Tie-Breaking Rules is a formal mechanism in decision-theoretic systems that resolves indeterminacies arising from equal-valued outcomes in Common-Value Auctions and Voting Rules by specifying a systematic procedure for selecting a unique winner or outcome when participants' bids or votes are tied.

106

Publications

5.1K

Citations

212

Authors

141

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

23

Authors

212

  1. EE
    Edith Elkind

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 139 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. SO
    Svetlana Obraztsova

    Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

    4 publications · 139 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. JS
    Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    3 publications · 176 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. JM
    Jeroen M. Swinkels

    Washington University in St. Louis, United States

    3 publications · 321 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. MO
    Matthew O. Jackson

    Stanford University, United States

    3 publications · 321 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 212

Venues

  1. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 4 publications · 113 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

    Conference · 4 publications · 187 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. Econometrica

    4 publications · 338 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 3 publications · 62 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Mathematics of Operations Research

    2 publications · 68 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5