Strategy-proof Mechanisms

Strategy-Proof Mechanisms is a mechanism in market design characterized by the property that it incentivizes participants to truthfully reveal their preferences, as no individual can achieve a better outcome by strategically misrepresenting their private information.

267

Publications

14.5K

Citations

356

Authors

222

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

67

Variants

Strategy-proof Mechanism

Authors

356

  1. SB
    Salvador Barberà

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain

    11 publications · 883 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. SS
    Shigehiro Serizawa

    Osaka University of Economics, Japan

    12 publications · 513 citations

    11

    h-index

  3. HP
    Hans Peters

    Maastricht University, Netherlands

    11 publications · 340 citations

    11

    h-index

  4. FW
    Fan Wu

    Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China

    10 publications · 583 citations

    10

    h-index

  5. GC
    Guihai Chen

    Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China

    8 publications · 445 citations

    8

    h-index

1–5 of 356

Venues

  1. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 23 publications · 1.5K citations

    21

    h-index

  2. Social Choice and Welfare

    26 publications · 1.3K citations

    18

    h-index

  3. Games and Economic Behavior

    15 publications · 636 citations

    14

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 12 publications · 544 citations

    12

    h-index

  5. Economic Theory

    10 publications · 265 citations

    10

    h-index

1–5