Strategy-proof Mechanisms
Strategy-Proof Mechanisms is a mechanism in market design characterized by the property that it incentivizes participants to truthfully reveal their preferences, as no individual can achieve a better outcome by strategically misrepresenting their private information.
267
Publications
14.5K
Citations
356
Authors
222
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
67
Variants
Strategy-proof Mechanism
Parents
267
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
Hervé Moulin · Public Choice · 1980 · 879 citations · Full text
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Shengwu Li · American Economic Review · 2017 · 451 citations
1–5 of 267
356
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222

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Cerdanyola del Vallès, Spain
13 h-index
14 publications
780 citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
12 h-index
12 publications
1K citations

Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Shanghai, China
12 h-index
12 publications
821 citations
Maastricht University
Maastricht, The Netherlands
11 h-index
13 publications
376 citations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
10 h-index
10 publications
609 citations
Université de Montréal
Montreal, Canada
10 h-index
10 publications
338 citations

Indian Statistical Institute
Kolkata, India
9 h-index
9 publications
239 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
8 h-index
8 publications
216 citations
1–8 of 222
JET · 23 publications · 1.5K citations
21
h-index
26 publications · 1.3K citations
18
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15 publications · 636 citations
14
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Repository · 12 publications · 544 citations
12
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10 publications · 265 citations
10
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1–5