Stackelberg Equilibrium
Stackelberg Equilibrium is a solution concept in game theory where one player, the leader, commits to a strategy first and the follower(s) subsequently choose their optimal strategies in response, resulting in an equilibrium that reflects the strategic advantage of commitment in sequential-move games.
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2017–2026
999
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Nanyang Technological University
Singapore, Singapore
35 h-index
143 publications
8.7K citations
University of Science and Technology of China
Hefei, China
24 h-index
74 publications
3.1K citations
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, United States
24 h-index
64 publications
6.7K citations

Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Beijing, China
24 h-index
117 publications
6.2K citations

Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
24 h-index
59 publications
3.7K citations

Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Shanghai, China
23 h-index
67 publications
3.7K citations
PLA Army Engineering University
Nanjing, China
21 h-index
98 publications
4.3K citations

North China Electric Power University
Beijing, China
21 h-index
61 publications
5.7K citations
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