Stackelberg Equilibrium

Stackelberg Equilibrium is a solution concept in game theory where one player, the leader, commits to a strategy first and the follower(s) subsequently choose their optimal strategies in response, resulting in an equilibrium that reflects the strategic advantage of commitment in sequential-move games.

1.8K

Publications

81.3K

Citations

3.9K

Authors

1.2K

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

999

Authors

3.9K

  1. DN
    Dusit Niyato

    Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

    42 publications · 2.3K citations

    26

    h-index

  2. ZH
    Zhu Han

    University of Houston, United States

    26 publications · 2.1K citations

    21

    h-index

  3. TB
    Tamer Başar

    University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, United States

    24 publications · 2K citations

    19

    h-index

  4. ZX
    Zehui Xiong

    Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

    22 publications · 1.4K citations

    18

    h-index

  5. MT
    Milind Tambe

    University of Southern California, United States

    16 publications · 1.3K citations

    15

    h-index

1–5 of 3.9K

Venues

  1. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology

    51 publications · 3.3K citations

    32

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  2. IEEE Internet of Things Journal

    30 publications · 1.8K citations

    26

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  3. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications

    28 publications · 2.3K citations

    24

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  4. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid

    23 publications · 4.2K citations

    23

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  5. International Journal of Production Research

    30 publications · 1.5K citations

    22

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1–5