Sequential Vickrey Auctions
Sequential Vickrey Auctions is a sequential auction mechanism in which each individual item is allocated using the Vickrey auction rule—assigning the item to the highest bidder at the price bid by the second-highest bidder—thereby extending the truthful single-item Vickrey auction to a multi-item, temporally ordered allocation process.
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Limitations of the Vickrey Auction in Computational Multiagent Systems
Tüomas Sandholm · 1996 · 164 citations
Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions
Tüomas Sandholm · International Journal of Electronic Commerce · 2000 · 119 citations
PREDATORY BIDDING IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
Nils‐Henrik M. von der Fehr · Oxford Economic Papers · 1994 · 61 citations
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
102 citations
École Normale Supérieure - PSL
Paris, France
1 h-index
1 publications
38 citations
Laboratoire de Probabilités et Modèles Aléatoires
Paris, France
1 h-index
1 publications
38 citations
Département d'Informatique
Paris, France
1 h-index
1 publications
38 citations

Berlin School of Economics and Law
Berlin, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
26 citations
University of Washington
Seattle, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
16 citations

University of Oslo
Oslo, Norway
1 h-index
1 publications
61 citations
Texas A&M University
College Station, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
90 citations
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Repository · 2 publications · 48 citations
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AHJ · 1 publications · 18 citations
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JET · 1 publications · 15 citations
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1 publications · 61 citations
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