Sequential Vickrey Auctions

Sequential Vickrey Auctions is a sequential auction mechanism in which each individual item is allocated using the Vickrey auction rule—assigning the item to the highest bidder at the price bid by the second-highest bidder—thereby extending the truthful single-item Vickrey auction to a multi-item, temporally ordered allocation process.

17

Publications

750

Citations

38

Authors

23

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

2

Authors

38

  1. VP
    Vianney Perchet

    École Normale Supérieure - PSL, France

    2 publications · 51 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. JW
    Jonathan Weed

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    2 publications · 51 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    2 publications · 283 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. JS
    Jiajun Sun

    Nanjing University, China

    2 publications · 35 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. PR
    Philippe Rigollet

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    2 publications · 51 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 38

Venues

  1. arXiv (Cornell University)

    Repository · 2 publications · 48 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. American Heart Journal

    AHJ · 1 publications · 18 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 1 publications · 15 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Oxford Economic Papers

    1 publications · 61 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

    1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5