Sequential Second-price Auctions

Sequential Second-Price Auctions is a sequential auction mechanism in which multiple items are sold in successive stages under the rule that each individual auction allocates the item to the highest bidder but at a price equal to the second-highest bid, thereby extending the Vickrey auction format over a temporal sequence of sales.

50

Publications

2K

Citations

89

Authors

65

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

2

Authors

89

  1. FM
    Flávio Menezes

    The University of Queensland, Australia

    3 publications · 74 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. BJ
    Bingli Jiao

    Peking University, China

    3 publications · 215 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. KI
    Krishnamurthy Iyer

    Cornell University, United States

    3 publications · 164 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. ZH
    Zhu Han

    University of Houston, United States

    3 publications · 215 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. TD
    Thomas D. Jeitschko

    Michigan State University, United States

    3 publications · 150 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 89

Venues

  1. Economics Letters

    7 publications · 279 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    3 publications · 217 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics

    2 publications · 34 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Oxford Economic Papers

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 2 publications · 103 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5