Sequential Second-price Auctions
Sequential Second-Price Auctions is a sequential auction mechanism in which multiple items are sold in successive stages under the rule that each individual auction allocates the item to the highest bidder but at a price equal to the second-highest bid, thereby extending the Vickrey auction format over a temporal sequence of sales.
50
Publications
2K
Citations
89
Authors
65
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
2
50
Sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects
Richard Engelbrecht‐Wiggans · Economics Letters · 1994 · 123 citations
Business, Economics, Mathematics +14
Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions
Tüomas Sandholm · International Journal of Electronic Commerce · 2000 · 119 citations
Dan Bernhardt, David Scoones · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · 1993 · 110 citations · Full text
1–5 of 50
89
3
h-index
3
h-index
3
h-index
3
h-index
3
h-index
1–5 of 89
65

Peking University
Beijing, China
3 h-index
10 publications
663 citations
Google (United States)
Mountain View, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
164 citations
University of Houston
Houston, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
215 citations
University of Southampton
Southampton, United Kingdom
3 h-index
9 publications
215 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
3 h-index
9 publications
567 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
211 citations

Australian National University
Canberra, Australia
3 h-index
4 publications
103 citations
Georgetown University
Washington, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
80 citations
1–8 of 65
7 publications · 279 citations
7
h-index
3 publications · 217 citations
3
h-index
2 publications · 34 citations
2
h-index
2 publications · 88 citations
2
h-index
JET · 2 publications · 103 citations
2
h-index
1–5