Sequential English Auctions

Sequential English Auctions is a sequential auction mechanism in which multiple items are sold one after another through English auctions, characterized by open ascending bidding and real-time price discovery, with the outcome of each auction influencing bidders' strategies in subsequent auctions.

15

Publications

471

Citations

24

Authors

27

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

2

Authors

24

  1. DH
    David Hirshleifer

    National Bureau of Economic Research, United States

    2 publications · 133 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. KD
    Kent Daniel

    National Bureau of Economic Research, United States

    2 publications · 133 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. HJ
    Harry J. Paarsch

    University of Iowa, United States

    2 publications · 81 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. BB
    Bjarne Brendstrup

    Aarhus University, Denmark

    2 publications · 58 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. JP
    Jon P. Nelson

    Pennsylvania State University, United States

    1 publications · 12 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 24

Venues

  1. Journal of Econometrics

    2 publications · 58 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 2 publications · 71 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. The RAND Journal of Economics

    1 publications · 20 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Economic Inquiry

    1 publications · 21 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Games and Economic Behavior

    1 publications · 14 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5