Selection Equilibrium

Selection Equilibrium is a solution concept in coordination games that refines Nash equilibria by selecting those outcomes which are favored under a criterion of evolutionary stability, payoff dominance, or focal point salience, thereby resolving equilibrium indeterminacy by identifying the uniquely compelling equilibrium to which rational agents converge.

117

Publications

10K

Citations

189

Authors

125

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

8

Authors

189

  1. JH
    Josef Hofbauer

    University of Vienna, Austria

    5 publications · 209 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. LS
    Larry Samuelson

    University of Wisconsin–Madison, United States

    4 publications · 1K citations

    4

    h-index

  3. JC
    John C. Harsanyi

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    4 publications · 2K citations

    4

    h-index

  4. BZ
    Boyu Zhang

    Beijing Normal University, China

    4 publications · 87 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. LE
    Lawrence E. Blume

    Cornell University, United States

    3 publications · 1.6K citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 189

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    12 publications · 2.3K citations

    11

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 9 publications · 501 citations

    9

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 7 publications · 134 citations

    7

    h-index

  4. Genetics

    6 publications · 545 citations

    6

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

    5 publications · 450 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5