Second-best Contracts

Second-Best Contracts is a theoretical framework in contract economics that, within the context of hidden action and informational asymmetry, specifies optimal contractual arrangements that maximize principal utility under incentive compatibility and participation constraints, departing from first-best efficiency due to unobservable agent behavior.

105

Publications

19.1K

Citations

167

Authors

108

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

12

Authors

167

  1. OH
    Oliver Hart

    Harvard University, United States

    4 publications · 9.9K citations

    4

    h-index

  2. AF
    Antoine Faure‐Grimaud

    London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 93 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. SJ
    Sanford J. Grossman

    University of Pennsylvania, United States

    2 publications · 9.5K citations

    2

    h-index

  4. BB
    Björn Bartling

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    2 publications · 132 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. JM
    John Moore

    London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 85 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 167

Venues

  1. The Review of Economic Studies

    8 publications · 609 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 6 publications · 156 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. The RAND Journal of Economics

    4 publications · 533 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. International Economic Review

    4 publications · 228 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 3 publications · 2.6K citations

    3

    h-index

1–5