Second-best Contracts
Second-Best Contracts is a theoretical framework in contract economics that, within the context of hidden action and informational asymmetry, specifies optimal contractual arrangements that maximize principal utility under incentive compatibility and participation constraints, departing from first-best efficiency due to unobservable agent behavior.
105
Publications
19.1K
Citations
167
Authors
108
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
12
Parents
105
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Roger B. Myerson, Mark A. Satterthwaite · Journal of Economic Theory · 1983 · 2.6K citations
1–5 of 105
167
4
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London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom
2 publications · 93 citations
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2
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2
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London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom
2 publications · 85 citations
2
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1–5 of 167
108
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
7 h-index
7 publications
700 citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
51 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
3 h-index
6 publications
1.8K citations
University of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
3 h-index
3 publications
155 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
61 citations
University of Mannheim
Mannheim, Germany
3 h-index
3 publications
84 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
5.2K citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
327 citations
1–8 of 108
8 publications · 609 citations
8
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Repository · 6 publications · 156 citations
6
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4 publications · 533 citations
4
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4 publications · 228 citations
4
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JET · 3 publications · 2.6K citations
3
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1–5