Screening For Collusion

Screening for Collusion is a methodological framework within antitrust economics that enables the detection of unlawful price-fixing agreements by systematically identifying statistical and behavioral anomalies indicative of coordinated market behavior among ostensibly independent firms.

9

Publications

510

Citations

19

Authors

14

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

5

Authors

19

  1. LM
    Luke M. Froeb

    Vanderbilt University, United States

    2 publications · 261 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. JG
    John Geweke

    University of Technology Sydney, Australia

    2 publications · 261 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. RM
    Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz

    CCM Clinical Research Group (United States), United States

    2 publications · 261 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. CT
    Christopher Taylor

    Federal Trade Commission, United States

    2 publications · 261 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. GC
    Gergely Csorba

    Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary

    1 publications · 22 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 19

Venues

  1. 2

    h-index

  2. Transport Policy

    1 publications · 14 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. European Journal of Law and Economics

    1 publications · 91 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. German Economic Review

    GER · 1 publications · 25 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Competition Law & Economics

    JCLE · 1 publications · 61 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5