Say-on-pay Effects
Say-On-Pay Effects is a corporate governance phenomenon denoting the influence of shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation practices, distinguished by the extent to which firms adjust pay structures and disclosures in response to voting outcomes and investor feedback.
82
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5.5K
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126
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108
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
25
Parents
82
Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay
Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, Volkan Muslu · Review of Financial Studies · 2010 · 406 citations
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108
European Corporate Governance Institute
Brussels, Belgium
11 h-index
17 publications
806 citations
University of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
5 h-index
6 publications
260 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
5 h-index
5 publications
163 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
5 h-index
6 publications
1.3K citations
University of Houston
Houston, United States
5 h-index
6 publications
216 citations
University of Miami
Coral Gables, United States
5 h-index
6 publications
324 citations
Universidad de Navarra
Pamplona, Spain
5 h-index
5 publications
275 citations
IESE Business School
Barcelona, Spain
5 h-index
5 publications
185 citations
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Repository · 29 publications · 940 citations
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3 publications · 778 citations
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3 publications · 116 citations
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2 publications · 195 citations
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2 publications · 532 citations
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