Repeated Zero-sum Games

Repeated Zero-Sum Games is a repeated game in which the stage game is a zero-sum game, distinguishing it from other repeated games by maintaining constant-sum payoffs across iterations and enabling the analysis of strategic behavior over time under strict competition.

43

Publications

1.6K

Citations

65

Authors

43

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

7

Authors

65

  1. SS
    Sylvain Sorin

    École Polytechnique, France

    5 publications · 173 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    4 publications · 73 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. SZ
    Shmuel Zamir

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    4 publications · 250 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. MA
    Mohammad A. Taha

    Suez Canal University, Egypt

    2 publications · 42 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. JM
    Jean‐François Mertens

    UCLouvain, Belgium

    2 publications · 171 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 65

Venues

  1. Mathematics of Operations Research

    4 publications · 213 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 3 publications · 95 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. International Journal of Game Theory

    3 publications · 193 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization

    3 publications · 91 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. The Annals of Statistics

    2 publications · 160 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5