Renegotiation Proofness

Renegotiation Proofness is a property of relational contracts in which an agreed-upon arrangement is such that no party has an incentive to propose a mutually beneficial modification after its initial agreement, thereby ensuring its stability under subsequent bargaining.

26

Publications

2.1K

Citations

33

Authors

25

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

33

  1. KK
    Kenneth Kletzer

    University of California, Santa Cruz, United States

    2 publications · 413 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. MH
    Martin Hellwig

    Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Germany

    2 publications · 49 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. BD
    Brian D. Wright

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    2 publications · 413 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. GB
    Geir B. Asheim

    University of Oslo, Norway

    2 publications · 46 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. NL
    Nisan Langberg

    University of Houston, United States

    1 publications · 76 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 33

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 4 publications · 89 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 2 publications · 103 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. The Review of Economic Studies

    2 publications · 462 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 2 publications · 41 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Games and Economic Behavior

    2 publications · 50 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5