Regulatory Cartelization

Regulatory Cartelization is a form of regulatory capture in which established firms collude with regulators to restrict market entry and competition, thereby using regulatory mechanisms to maintain a sustained advantage akin to a cartel.

29

Publications

1K

Citations

44

Authors

31

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Authors

44

  1. DG
    Daisaku Goto

    Hiroshima University, Japan

    2 publications · 118 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. TF
    Tony Freyer

    University of Arkansas at Little Rock, United States

    2 publications · 31 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. YO
    Yasunori Ouchida

    Hiroshima University, Japan

    2 publications · 118 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. RM
    Robert Marquez

    University of California, Davis, United States

    1 publications · 40 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. PW
    Paul W. MacAvoy

    Yale University, United States

    1 publications · 68 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 44

Venues

  1. Cadmus - EUI Research Repository (European University Institute)

    Repository · 2 publications · 95 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Computer law & security review

    1 publications · 24 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. The Journal of Southern History

    1 publications · 68 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. International Review of Law and Economics

    1 publications · 19 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law

    MJ · 1 publications · 23 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5