Regulatory Cartelization
Regulatory Cartelization is a form of regulatory capture in which established firms collude with regulators to restrict market entry and competition, thereby using regulatory mechanisms to maintain a sustained advantage akin to a cartel.
29
Publications
1K
Citations
44
Authors
31
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
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31
University of California, Davis
Davis, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
198 citations
George Mason University
Fairfax, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
30 citations

Hiroshima University
Hiroshima, Japan
2 h-index
3 publications
179 citations
Core Competence
Santa Fe, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
17 citations
University of Illinois System
Urbana, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
University of Maryland, College Park
College Park, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
40 citations
Hiroshima University of Economics
Hiroshima, Japan
1 h-index
1 publications
57 citations

International Monetary Fund
Washington D.C., United States
1 h-index
1 publications
40 citations
1–8 of 31
Repository · 2 publications · 95 citations
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1 publications · 24 citations
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1 publications · 68 citations
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1 publications · 19 citations
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MJ · 1 publications · 23 citations
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