Reductive Physicalism

Reductive Physicalism is a metaphysical theory within the philosophy of mind asserting that mental phenomena are identical to physical phenomena, specifically that mental states and properties can be fully explained as and reduced to neurobiological states and processes in the brain.

105

Publications

5.9K

Citations

99

Authors

80

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

10

Variants

Identity TheoryType Physicalism

Authors

99

  1. AM
    Andrew Melnyk

    University of Missouri, United States

    6 publications · 140 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. BG
    Barbara Gail Montero

    City University of New York, United States

    5 publications · 316 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. DP
    David Papineau

    King's College London, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 202 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. KM
    Kevin Morris

    Carthage College, United States

    3 publications · 72 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. JW
    Jessica Wilson

    University of Toronto, Canada

    3 publications · 485 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 99

Venues

  1. Australasian Journal of Philosophy

    6 publications · 205 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. Analysis

    5 publications · 154 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. Philosophy of Science

    5 publications · 139 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. Choice Reviews Online

    CRO · 4 publications · 1.6K citations

    4

    h-index

  5. The Philosophical Quarterly

    4 publications · 408 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5