Pure Common Value Models

Pure Common Value Models is a theoretical framework in auction economics that belongs to the class of valuation models in which the object's true value is identical for all bidders, distinguished by the assumption that uncertainty about this common value arises solely from imperfect information, not from bidder-specific preferences or private signals.

19

Publications

1.3K

Citations

22

Authors

25

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

22

  1. SA
    Susan Athey

    Stanford University, United States

    3 publications · 484 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. PA
    Philip A. Haile

    Yale University, United States

    3 publications · 484 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. SD
    Songzi Du

    University of California San Diego, United States

    3 publications · 95 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. BB
    Benjamin Brooks

    University of Virginia, United States

    3 publications · 78 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. NP
    Nikhil P. Varaiya

    San Diego State University, United States

    2 publications · 166 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 22

Venues

  1. Econometrica

    5 publications · 730 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 5 publications · 123 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. The Journal of Finance

    2 publications · 166 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. American Economic Review

    2 publications · 126 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 2 publications · 22 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5