Propositional Attitude Ascriptions

Propositional Attitude Ascriptions is a semantic construct in analytic philosophy that designates the linguistic practice of attributing intentional mental states—such as belief, desire, or knowledge—to individuals through sentential formulations that specify both the subject and the propositional content believed, desired, or known, distinguishing it from non-attitudinal or non-propositional forms of psychological ascription.

81

Publications

8.5K

Citations

90

Authors

60

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

9

Variants

Attitude Ascriptions

Authors

90

  1. SS
    Scott Soames

    Princeton University, United States

    4 publications · 820 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. HR
    Hannes Rakoczy

    University of Göttingen, Germany

    3 publications · 890 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. PM
    Paul M. Churchland

    University of California San Diego, United States

    2 publications · 3.3K citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MJ
    M. J. Cresswell

    Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

    2 publications · 33 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. MR
    Mark Richard

    Tufts University, United States

    2 publications · 131 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 90

Venues

  1. Noûs

    6 publications · 308 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. Philosophical Studies

    4 publications · 241 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. Canadian Journal of Philosophy

    CJP · 4 publications · 186 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

    3 publications · 80 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Synthese

    3 publications · 232 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5