Propositional Attitude Ascriptions
Propositional Attitude Ascriptions is a semantic construct in analytic philosophy that designates the linguistic practice of attributing intentional mental states—such as belief, desire, or knowledge—to individuals through sentential formulations that specify both the subject and the propositional content believed, desired, or known, distinguishing it from non-attitudinal or non-propositional forms of psychological ascription.
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Attitude Ascriptions
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Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
Paul M. Churchland · The Journal of Philosophy · 1981 · 1.5K citations
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New York University
New York, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
236 citations
Tufts University
Medford, United States
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3 publications
194 citations
Princeton University
Princeton, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
78 citations
University of Sheffield
Sheffield, United Kingdom
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2 publications
47 citations
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
Leipzig, Germany
2 h-index
4 publications
1.2K citations

University of Göttingen
Göttingen, Germany
2 h-index
5 publications
754 citations
California Southern University
Chandler, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
45 citations

Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv, Israel
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3 publications
161 citations
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6 publications · 308 citations
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CJP · 4 publications · 186 citations
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