Permit Auction Design

Permit Auction Design is a formal framework within environmental economics that specifies the rules, mechanisms, and allocation procedures governing the competitive sale of tradable emissions permits, distinguishing it from alternative permit allocation methods by its reliance on auctioning to distribute emission rights efficiently and generate public revenue.

35

Publications

2K

Citations

61

Authors

45

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

6

Authors

61

  1. SK
    Suzi Kerr

    Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, New Zealand

    5 publications · 581 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. PC
    Peter Cramton

    University of Maryland, College Park, United States

    4 publications · 524 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. TA
    Takashi Akamatsu

    Tohoku University, Japan

    3 publications · 84 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. KW
    Kentaro Wada

    The University of Tokyo, Japan

    3 publications · 84 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. MG
    Michael Grubb

    University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 338 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 61

Venues

  1. 3

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  2. Climate Policy

    3 publications · 359 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 3 publications · 190 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 2 publications · 34 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Environmental and Resource Economics

    2 publications · 43 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5