Perceptual Justification

Perceptual Justification is an epistemic status conferred on a belief in virtue of its being appropriately grounded in perceptual experience, distinguishing it from other forms of justification by its direct dependence on sensory-based representational content.

65

Publications

3.4K

Citations

59

Authors

50

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

18

Authors

59

  1. EC
    Elijah Chudnoff

    University of Miami, United States

    3 publications · 204 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. JQ
    Jake Quilty‐Dunn

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 126 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. CT
    Chris Tucker

    University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, United States

    2 publications · 97 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. RC
    Robert Cowan

    University of Glasgow, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 118 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. JM
    Jessie Munton

    University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 130 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 59

Venues

  1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

    PPR · 7 publications · 855 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. Australasian Journal of Philosophy

    5 publications · 172 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. Synthese

    3 publications · 135 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. Philosophical Studies

    3 publications · 148 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Inquiry

    3 publications · 176 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5