Non-reductive Physicalism

Non-Reductive Physicalism is a metaphysical theory in the philosophy of mind that asserts mental phenomena are ontologically dependent on physical processes but cannot be fully reduced to or explained by them due to their characteristic autonomy in causal and explanatory roles.

122

Publications

6.4K

Citations

108

Authors

87

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

19

Authors

108

  1. AM
    Andrew Melnyk

    University of Missouri, United States

    5 publications · 114 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. DP
    David Papineau

    King's College London, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 202 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. BG
    Barbara Gail Montero

    City University of New York, United States

    4 publications · 207 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. SS
    Susan Schneider

    Duke University, United States

    4 publications · 108 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. MB
    Michael Baumgärtner

    University of Geneva, Switzerland

    3 publications · 178 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 108

Venues

  1. Analysis

    10 publications · 259 citations

    10

    h-index

  2. Australasian Journal of Philosophy

    8 publications · 284 citations

    8

    h-index

  3. Synthese

    7 publications · 165 citations

    7

    h-index

  4. Journal of Consciousness Studies

    6 publications · 206 citations

    6

    h-index

  5. Philosophy of Science

    5 publications · 168 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5