No-miracles Argument

The No-Miracles Argument is a philosophical argument in the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism that asserts the empirical success of scientific theories would be miraculous if those theories were not at least approximately true, thereby distinguishing it from other arguments by grounding the realist position in the explanatory necessity of truth for predictive accuracy.

23

Publications

1K

Citations

20

Authors

16

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

20

  1. CO
    Christine Overall

    Queen's University, Canada

    2 publications · 87 citations

    2

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  2. MA
    Mario Alai

    University of Urbino, Italy

    2 publications · 70 citations

    2

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  3. DA
    Derek Abbott

    The University of Adelaide, Australia

    1 publications · 25 citations

    1

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  4. DB
    David Basinger

    Roberts Wesleyan College, United States

    1 publications · 17 citations

    1

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  5. CC
    Craig Callender

    University of California San Diego, United States

    1 publications · 239 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 20

Venues

  1. Philosophy of Science

    4 publications · 460 citations

    4

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  2. European Journal for Philosophy of Science

    2 publications · 32 citations

    2

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  3. Synthese

    2 publications · 46 citations

    2

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  4. Choice Reviews Online

    CRO · 2 publications · 123 citations

    2

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  5. The Southern Journal of Philosophy

    2 publications · 34 citations

    2

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1–5