No-miracles Argument
The No-Miracles Argument is a philosophical argument in the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism that asserts the empirical success of scientific theories would be miraculous if those theories were not at least approximately true, thereby distinguishing it from other arguments by grounding the realist position in the explanatory necessity of truth for predictive accuracy.
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2017–2026
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Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy
P. D. Magnus, Craig Callender · Philosophy of Science · 2004 · 239 citations · Full text
Humanities, Philosophy, Psychology +15
Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction’
Stathis Psillos · Philosophy of Science · 1996 · 112 citations
Science and religion: are they compatible?
Choice Reviews Online · 2003 · 76 citations
Humanities, Philosophy, Religion +13
Miracles, Evidence, Evil, and God: A Twenty-Year Debate
Christine Overall · Dialogue · 2006 · 70 citations
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Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
2 h-index
2 publications
87 citations
University of Urbino
Urbino, Italy
2 h-index
2 publications
70 citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
142 citations

Tilburg University
Tilburg, The Netherlands
1 h-index
1 publications
13 citations

Durham University
Durham, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
27 citations
University at Albany, State University of New York
Albany, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
239 citations
Roberts Wesleyan College
Rochester, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
17 citations
University of California San Diego
San Diego, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
478 citations
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4 publications · 460 citations
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2 publications · 32 citations
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2 publications · 46 citations
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CRO · 2 publications · 123 citations
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2 publications · 34 citations
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