Necessary Truths
Necessary Truths is a metaphysical proposition that, by virtue of its logical or conceptual structure, holds in all possible worlds and is thus invariant across every conceivable instantiation of reality, distinguishing it from contingent truths that depend on specific worldly conditions.
107
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5.6K
Citations
104
Authors
59
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
14
Variants
Necessary Propositions
107
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?
Stephen Yablo · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 1993 · 737 citations
The Logic of What Might Have Been
Nathan Salmón · The Philosophical Review · 1989 · 259 citations · Full text
Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy
David Sedley · Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society · 1977 · 228 citations · Full text
Humanities, History, Philosophy +11
Descartes's Theory of Modality
Jonathan Bennett · The Philosophical Review · 1994 · 194 citations
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59

University of Leeds
Leeds, United Kingdom
4 h-index
5 publications
190 citations
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, United Kingdom
4 h-index
4 publications
133 citations
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
85 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
3 h-index
3 publications
48 citations

University of Helsinki
Helsinki, Finland
2 h-index
2 publications
70 citations
King's College London
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
103 citations

The University of Sydney
Sydney, Australia
2 h-index
2 publications
75 citations

York University
Toronto, Canada
2 h-index
2 publications
33 citations
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7 publications · 132 citations
7
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PPR · 5 publications · 842 citations
5
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5 publications · 163 citations
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5 publications · 215 citations
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5 publications · 243 citations
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