Multi-unit Auction Equilibria

Multi-Unit Auction Equilibria is a theoretical framework in auction theory that characterizes the strategic outcomes in multi-unit auctions where bidders' optimal bidding behaviors and market-clearing prices stabilize under equilibrium conditions, distinguishing it from general auction models by explicitly accounting for interdependent valuations and allocation rules across multiple identical or heterogeneous units.

106

Publications

7.4K

Citations

162

Authors

145

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

8

Authors

162

  1. RE
    Richard Engelbrecht‐Wiggans

    University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, United States

    7 publications · 668 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. CM
    Charles M. Kahn

    University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, United States

    4 publications · 406 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. DM
    David McAdams

    Duke University, United States

    3 publications · 109 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. JA
    John A. List

    University of Chicago, United States

    3 publications · 422 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. PH
    Pär Holmberg

    Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden

    3 publications · 45 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 162

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 11 publications · 334 citations

    10

    h-index

  2. Economic Theory

    9 publications · 592 citations

    9

    h-index

  3. Economics Letters

    6 publications · 300 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. Games and Economic Behavior

    5 publications · 397 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 5 publications · 147 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5