Modal Fictionalism

Modal Fictionalism is a philosophical doctrine within modal logic that treats possible worlds as useful fictions rather than real entities, thereby interpreting modal statements as true or false relative to a fictional narrative rather than as assertions about ontologically committed domains.

20

Publications

1K

Citations

14

Authors

11

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Authors

14

  1. JD
    John Divers

    University of Leeds, United Kingdom

    3 publications · 82 citations

    3

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  2. GR
    Gideon Rosen

    Princeton University, United States

    3 publications · 432 citations

    3

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  3. RW
    Richard Woodward

    University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 53 citations

    2

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  4. BH
    Bob Hale

    University of Glasgow, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 58 citations

    2

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  5. FB
    Francesco Berto

    University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

    1 publications · 91 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 14

Venues

  1. Analysis

    8 publications · 280 citations

    8

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  2. Philosophical Studies

    3 publications · 128 citations

    3

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  3. Mind

    3 publications · 419 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. 1

    h-index

  5. American Philosophical Quarterly

    APQ · 1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5