Matching Equilibrium Existence

Matching Equilibrium Existence is a theoretical framework within the domain of game theory and mathematical economics that establishes conditions under which a stable assignment, or matching, between rational agents exists such that no pair of agents has an incentive to deviate from their assigned counterparts given their preferences and strategic interactions.

228

Publications

12.5K

Citations

318

Authors

239

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

44

Authors

318

  1. FK
    Fuhito Kojima

    Stanford University, United States

    14 publications · 801 citations

    12

    h-index

  2. SD
    Scott Duke Kominers

    Harvard University, United States

    11 publications · 336 citations

    10

    h-index

  3. JW
    John William Hatfield

    The University of Texas at Austin, United States

    11 publications · 492 citations

    10

    h-index

  4. MB
    M. Bumin Yenmez

    Boston College, United States

    6 publications · 119 citations

    6

    h-index

  5. PB
    Péter Bíró

    Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary

    5 publications · 129 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5 of 318

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 22 publications · 742 citations

    16

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 16 publications · 1.1K citations

    15

    h-index

  3. Games and Economic Behavior

    13 publications · 628 citations

    12

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    8 publications · 1.2K citations

    8

    h-index

  5. International Journal of Game Theory

    7 publications · 239 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5