Management Proxy Contests

Management Proxy Contests is a type of proxy contest in corporate governance wherein the incumbent management team solicits shareholder votes to retain control of the board of directors against opposition from an external party or dissident shareholder group challenging for board representation, distinguished by the alignment of management with the proponent side in the solicitation of proxies.

26

Publications

1.7K

Citations

46

Authors

29

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

5

Authors

46

  1. TL
    Tao Li

    University of Florida, United States

    3 publications · 111 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. WJ
    Wei Jiang

    Emory University, United States

    3 publications · 380 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. AB
    Alon Brav

    Duke University, United States

    3 publications · 380 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. JP
    James Pinnington

    University of Florida, United States

    2 publications · 86 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. MW
    Matthew W. Ragas

    DePaul University, United States

    2 publications · 63 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 46

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 4 publications · 452 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Journal of Financial Economics

    4 publications · 528 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. Review of Financial Studies

    2 publications · 78 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. The Journal of Business

    JB · 2 publications · 306 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Financial Management

    FM · 2 publications · 42 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5