Management Fee Manipulation
Management Fee Manipulation is a strategic practice within the domain of international profit shifting wherein multinational enterprises artificially adjust intercompany fees for managerial services to relocate taxable profits to lower-tax jurisdictions in order to minimize overall tax liability.
4
Publications
238
Citations
9
Authors
8
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
1
Parents
4
Julie H. Collins, Douglas A. Shackelford · Journal of Accounting and Economics · 1997 · 101 citations
Gaming Performance Fees By Portfolio Managers
Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2010 · 49 citations · Full text
1–4 of 4
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University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States
1 publications · 101 citations
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1
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1
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National University of Science and Technology, Zimbabwe
1 publications · 55 citations
1
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1–5 of 9
8

University of Namibia
Windhoek, Namibia
1 h-index
1 publications
55 citations

Tilburg University
Tilburg, The Netherlands
1 h-index
1 publications
33 citations

York University
Toronto, Canada
1 h-index
1 publications
33 citations

Brookings Institution
Washington D.C., United States
1 h-index
2 publications
98 citations

Université Paris Dauphine-PSL
Paris, France
1 h-index
1 publications
33 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
98 citations

National University of Science and Technology
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
1 h-index
1 publications
55 citations
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
202 citations
1–8 of 8
QJE · 1 publications · 49 citations
1
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1 publications · 101 citations
1
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1 publications · 33 citations
1
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1 publications · 55 citations
1
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