Level-K Reasoning is a cognitive hierarchy model in behavioral game theory that posits individuals engage in a fixed number of iterative strategic steps, with each level-k agent assuming all opponents are at level-(k−1), thereby differentiating it from equilibrium-based reasoning by emphasizing bounded strategic depth.
30
Publications
1.8K
Citations
52
Authors
40
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
7
Variants
Level-k Model
Parents
Publications
30
A Dynamic Level-<i>k</i> Model in Sequential Games
Teck‐Hua Ho, Xuanming Su · Management Science · 2012 · 95 citations
1–5 of 30
Authors
52
- VL
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- DG
5
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- AA
3
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- AR
2
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- RS
2
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1–5 of 52
Institutions
40
German Institute for Economic Research
Berlin, Germany
3 h-index
3 publications
148 citations
IZA - Institute of Labor Economics
Bonn, Germany
3 h-index
3 publications
148 citations
Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv, Israel
2 h-index
3 publications
527 citations
University of East Anglia
Norwich, United Kingdom
2 h-index
3 publications
136 citations
Purdue University West Lafayette
West Lafayette, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
688 citations
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Barcelona, Spain
2 h-index
2 publications
527 citations
University at Buffalo, State University of New York
Buffalo, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
34 citations
UNSW Sydney
Sydney, Australia
1 h-index
1 publications
12 citations
1–8 of 40
Venues
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 5 publications · 178 citations
5
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- Games and Economic Behavior
2 publications · 73 citations
2
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- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 2 publications · 28 citations
2
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- Management Science
1 publications · 95 citations
1
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- AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA)
Repository · 1 publications · 15 citations
1
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1–5