Leniency Programmes

Leniency Programmes is a formal legal mechanism within antitrust enforcement frameworks that grants immunity or reduced penalties to cartel members who voluntarily disclose their involvement and cooperate with competition authorities, distinguishing it from other enforcement tools by incentivizing self-reporting to facilitate detection and dismantling of cartels.

77

Publications

4.6K

Citations

84

Authors

84

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

8

Variants

Leniency Programs

Authors

84

  1. GS
    Giancarlo Spagnolo

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    18 publications · 828 citations

    14

    h-index

  2. PB
    Paolo Buccirossi

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    6 publications · 207 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. JE
    Joseph E. Harrington

    Johns Hopkins University, United States

    5 publications · 412 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. CL
    Chloé Le Coq

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    4 publications · 63 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. MB
    Maria Bigoni

    University of Bologna, Italy

    4 publications · 63 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5 of 84

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 26 publications · 1.4K citations

    16

    h-index

  2. International Journal of Industrial Organization

    6 publications · 1.1K citations

    6

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 5 publications · 144 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. Econstor (Econstor)

    Repository · 3 publications · 257 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Journal of Industrial Economics

    3 publications · 340 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5