Leniency Policy Effectiveness is a scholarly construct in competition law and economics that denotes the capacity of leniency programs to deter cartels and facilitate their detection and dismantling by incentivizing firms to self-report illegal collusion.
65
Publications
3.2K
Citations
73
Authors
78
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
8
Parents
Publications
65
Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement
Nathan H. Miller · American Economic Review · 2009 · 298 citations
Law, Business Economics, Strategy +13
Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programs
Giancarlo Spagnolo · SSRN Electronic Journal · 2004 · 143 citations · Full text
1–5 of 65
Authors
73
- GS
13
h-index
- SFSven‐Olof Fridolfsson
Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden
6 publications · 174 citations
6
h-index
- CL
6
h-index
- MB
6
h-index
- CM
4
h-index
1–5 of 73
Institutions
78
Stockholm School of Economics
Stockholm, Sweden
11 h-index
20 publications
767 citations
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Rome, Italy
10 h-index
10 publications
278 citations
University of Rome Tor Vergata
Rome, Italy
10 h-index
11 publications
378 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
10 h-index
10 publications
278 citations
Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Stockholm, Sweden
5 h-index
5 publications
151 citations
University of Bologna
Bologna, Italy
5 h-index
5 publications
151 citations
IZA - Institute of Labor Economics
Bonn, Germany
4 h-index
4 publications
51 citations
Toulouse School of Economics
Toulouse, France
4 h-index
4 publications
222 citations
1–8 of 78
Venues
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 24 publications · 841 citations
16
h-index
- International Journal of Industrial Organization
6 publications · 690 citations
6
h-index
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Repository · 4 publications · 112 citations
4
h-index
- Econstor (Econstor)
Repository · 3 publications · 132 citations
3
h-index
- The Journal of Law and Economics
JLE · 2 publications · 169 citations
2
h-index
1–5