Legislative Capture

Legislative Capture is a form of political influence in which regulatory or legislative bodies are dominated by the interests of specific industries or groups they are intended to regulate, resulting in policies that prioritize those private interests over public welfare.

3

Publications

1.2K

Citations

4

Authors

3

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

4

  1. JA
    James A. E. Macpherson

    The Ohio State University, United States

    1 publications · 10 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. JE
    James E. Anderson

    Ford Motor Company (United States), United States

    1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. JL
    Jean‐Jacques Laffont

    Institut d'Économie Industrielle, France

    1 publications · 1.1K citations

    1

    h-index

  4. JT
    J. Tirole

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    1 publications · 1.1K citations

    1

    h-index

  5. ZE
    Zsolt Enyedi

    Central European University, Austria

    1 publications · 10 citations

    0

    h-index

1–5 of 4

Venues

  1. The Quarterly Journal of Economics

    QJE · 1 publications · 1.1K citations

    1

    h-index

  2. Review of Policy Research

    RPR · 1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Law and Philosophy

    1 publications · 10 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Law Democracy & Development

    1 publications · 17 citations

1–5