Legislative Asymmetry
Legislative Asymmetry is a structural feature of federal bicameralism within asymmetric federal systems whereby subnational units possess unequal legislative powers, representation, or institutional capacities in the upper legislative chamber, distinguishing it from symmetric models that afford uniform legislative authority or representation to all constituent units.
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2.6K
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17
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2017–2026
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Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
Steven A. Matthews · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1989 · 218 citations
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Mannheim Centre for European Social Research
Mannheim, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
87 citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
222 citations
University of Mannheim
Mannheim, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
87 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
218 citations
University of California, Santa Cruz
Santa Cruz, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
27 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
11 citations
University of Kent
Canterbury, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
33 citations
Wadsworth Center
Albany, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
111 citations
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3 publications · 106 citations
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QJE · 1 publications · 218 citations
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1 publications · 10 citations
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1 publications · 87 citations
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AJPS · 1 publications · 411 citations
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