Least Core

The Least Core is a solution concept in cooperative game theory that belongs to the class of core-based allocations, distinguished by minimizing the maximum excess payoff across all coalitions through the introduction of a uniform subsidy to prevent coalition defections.

42

Publications

1.3K

Citations

80

Authors

44

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

6

Authors

80

  1. BP
    Bezalel Peleg

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    3 publications · 192 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. EE
    Edith Elkind

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    3 publications · 166 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. AK
    Alf Kimms

    University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany

    2 publications · 64 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MM
    Mássimo Marinacci

    Bocconi University, Italy

    2 publications · 44 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. JV
    Jaber Valizadeh

    Islamic Azad University Saveh, Iran

    2 publications · 46 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 80

Venues

  1. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

    Conference · 3 publications · 69 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. European Journal of Operational Research

    3 publications · 81 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. ePrints Soton (University of Southampton)

    Repository · 3 publications · 136 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Annals of Operations Research

    2 publications · 34 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Journal of Mathematical Economics

    2 publications · 162 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5