Interlocal Fiscal Competition

Interlocal Fiscal Competition is a theoretical construct in public finance that denotes the strategic interaction among subnational governments, distinguished by their engagement in fiscal policy adjustments—such as taxation and expenditure decisions—to attract mobile resources like capital and labor, thereby influencing jurisdictional attractiveness relative to neighboring localities.

65

Publications

3.1K

Citations

98

Authors

79

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

12

Variants

Interjurisdictional Fiscal Competition

Authors

98

  1. DR
    David R. Agrawal

    University of Kentucky, United States

    5 publications · 184 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. RP
    Raphaël Parchet

    Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland

    4 publications · 241 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. JD
    John D. Wilson

    Michigan State University, United States

    3 publications · 121 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. WH
    William H. Hoyt

    University of Kentucky, United States

    3 publications · 121 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. TB
    Thiess Buettner

    Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Germany

    3 publications · 247 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 98

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 7 publications · 205 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 5 publications · 153 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. Public Finance Review

    PFR · 4 publications · 88 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. Journal of Urban Economics

    3 publications · 143 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Public Choice

    3 publications · 119 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5