Information Signaling
Information Signaling is a theoretical construct in corporate finance that explains how dividend payout decisions serve as a deliberate communication mechanism through which management conveys private information about a firm's future earnings prospects to investors.
248
Publications
30.8K
Citations
440
Authors
276
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
42
Parents
248
Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium
Kose John, Joseph Williams · The Journal of Finance · 1985 · 1.5K citations
Optimal Release of Information By Firms
Douglas W. Diamond · The Journal of Finance · 1985 · 1.1K citations
1–5 of 248
440
4
h-index
4
h-index
4
h-index
4
h-index
4
h-index
1–5 of 440
276
New York University
New York, United States
9 h-index
12 publications
1.1K citations

Cornell University
Ithaca, United States
5 h-index
10 publications
640 citations

Washington University in St. Louis
St Louis, United States
5 h-index
8 publications
601 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
4 h-index
6 publications
718 citations
Syracuse University
Syracuse, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
339 citations
University of Washington
Seattle, United States
4 h-index
6 publications
232 citations

Bank of England
London, United Kingdom
4 h-index
4 publications
266 citations
Duke University
Durham, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
626 citations
1–8 of 276
27 publications · 7.3K citations
25
h-index
JFQA · 19 publications · 2.1K citations
18
h-index
Repository · 28 publications · 859 citations
16
h-index
FM · 8 publications · 732 citations
8
h-index
6 publications · 156 citations
6
h-index
1–5