Incentive-compatible Procurement
Incentive-Compatible Procurement is a procurement contract design approach that belongs to the class of mechanism design frameworks, distinguished by its explicit structuring of rewards and penalties to align the self-interested motivations of suppliers with the buyer's objectives, thereby ensuring truthful revelation of private information and optimal performance outcomes.
43
Publications
6.6K
Citations
94
Authors
60
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
13
Variants
Incentive Compatible Procurement
Parents
43
1–5 of 43
94
4
h-index
3
h-index
2
h-index
2
h-index
2
h-index
1–5 of 94
60
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
4 h-index
6 publications
491 citations
University of Southampton
Southampton, United Kingdom
2 h-index
5 publications
199 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
429 citations

University of Rome Tor Vergata
Rome, Italy
2 h-index
2 publications
36 citations
IBM (United States)
Armonk, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
203 citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
269 citations
University of South Carolina
Columbia, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
195 citations
RWTH Aachen University
Aachen, Germany
1 h-index
2 publications
52 citations
1–8 of 60
3 publications · 63 citations
3
h-index
Repository · 2 publications · 229 citations
2
h-index
2 publications · 1.2K citations
2
h-index
2 publications · 67 citations
2
h-index
1 publications · 24 citations
1
h-index
1–5