Incentive-compatible Procurement

Incentive-Compatible Procurement is a procurement contract design approach that belongs to the class of mechanism design frameworks, distinguished by its explicit structuring of rewards and penalties to align the self-interested motivations of suppliers with the buyer's objectives, thereby ensuring truthful revelation of private information and optimal performance outcomes.

43

Publications

6.6K

Citations

94

Authors

60

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

13

Variants

Incentive Compatible Procurement

Authors

94

  1. MB
    Moshe Babaioff

    Microsoft (United States), United States

    4 publications · 347 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. PB
    Patrick Bajari

    National Bureau of Economic Research, United States

    3 publications · 1.5K citations

    3

    h-index

  3. WP
    William P. Rogerson

    Northwestern University, United States

    2 publications · 210 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. NN
    Noam Nisan

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    2 publications · 144 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. ST
    Steven Tadelis

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    2 publications · 1.3K citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 94

Venues

  1. European Journal of Operational Research

    3 publications · 63 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 2 publications · 229 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. The RAND Journal of Economics

    2 publications · 1.2K citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Management Science

    2 publications · 67 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Utilities Policy

    1 publications · 24 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5