Implicit Bailouts
Implicit Bailouts is a subnational debt phenomenon in which higher-level government entities are perceived to rescue financially distressed subnational governments without explicit legal or institutional commitments, thereby creating moral hazard through anticipated fiscal interventions.
35
Publications
2K
Citations
60
Authors
49
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
9
Parents
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60
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49
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Philadelphia, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
49 citations

Western University
London, Canada
2 h-index
2 publications
32 citations

Deutsche Bundesbank
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
2 h-index
2 publications
101 citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
418 citations

International Monetary Fund
Washington D.C., United States
2 h-index
2 publications
72 citations
University of South Carolina
Columbia, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
72 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
169 citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
128 citations
1–8 of 49
Repository · 8 publications · 235 citations
8
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4 publications · 514 citations
4
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2 publications · 100 citations
2
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Repository · 2 publications · 27 citations
2
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JFI · 1 publications · 26 citations
1
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1–5