Implicit Bailouts

Implicit Bailouts is a subnational debt phenomenon in which higher-level government entities are perceived to rescue financially distressed subnational governments without explicit legal or institutional commitments, thereby creating moral hazard through anticipated fiscal interventions.

35

Publications

2K

Citations

60

Authors

49

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

9

Authors

60

  1. EF
    Emmanuel Farhi

    Harvard University Press, United States

    3 publications · 384 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. JT
    Jean Tirole

    Institut d'Économie Industrielle, France

    3 publications · 384 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. RA
    Raluca A. Roman

    University of South Carolina, United States

    2 publications · 36 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. FH
    Florian Hett

    Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany

    2 publications · 101 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. MR
    Michael R. King

    Royal Gustavus Adolphus Academy, Sweden

    2 publications · 32 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 60

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 8 publications · 235 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. Journal of Banking & Finance

    4 publications · 514 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. Journal of International Economics

    2 publications · 100 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 2 publications · 27 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Journal of Financial Intermediation

    JFI · 1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5