Going Concern Manipulation

Going Concern Manipulation is a financial reporting practice in which management misrepresents the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern by altering disclosures or accounting estimates to avoid triggering default clauses, regulatory scrutiny, or auditor qualifications, thereby concealing financial distress.

8

Publications

515

Citations

15

Authors

11

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

3

Authors

15

  1. MA
    Marshall A. Geiger

    University of Richmond, United States

    1 publications · 17 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. JW
    Jia Wu

    University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, United States

    1 publications · 16 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. MA
    Mohamed Azzim Gulamhussen

    Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Portugal

    1 publications · 23 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. HX
    Hongkang Xu

    University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, United States

    1 publications · 16 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. SS
    Stefan Sundgren

    Umeå University, Sweden

    1 publications · 222 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 15

Venues

  1. The International Journal of Accounting

    1 publications · 23 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. Managerial Auditing Journal

    MAJ · 1 publications · 42 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. International Journal of Auditing

    IJA · 1 publications · 17 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Advances in Accounting

    1 publications · 13 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

    1 publications · 171 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5