Flush+reload Attacks

Flush+Reload Attacks is a side-channel attack technique in microarchitectural security that exploits cache timing behavior by flushing a target memory line from the cache, allowing an observer to infer secret-dependent execution paths based on reload timing measurements.

25

Publications

3.1K

Citations

70

Authors

34

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

13

Variants

Flush+reload

Authors

70

  1. BS
    Berk Sunar

    Worcester Polytechnic Institute, United States

    3 publications · 399 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. YZ
    Yinqian Zhang

    The Ohio State University, United States

    3 publications · 532 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. CW
    Christopher W. Fletcher

    University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, United States

    3 publications · 163 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. TE
    Thomas Eisenbarth

    Worcester Polytechnic Institute, United States

    3 publications · 399 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. GI
    Gorka Irazoqui

    Worcester Polytechnic Institute, United States

    2 publications · 383 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 70

Venues

  1. arXiv (Cornell University)

    Repository · 4 publications · 312 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive

    Repository · 3 publications · 1.2K citations

    3

    h-index

  3. IEEE Embedded Systems Letters

    1 publications · 15 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Applied Sciences

    1 publications · 18 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

    PoPETs · 1 publications · 45 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5