Finitely Repeated Games

Finitely Repeated Games is a repeated game in which a base stage game is played a fixed and known number of times, with players' strategies conditioned on the entire history of play up to each stage.

45

Publications

7.5K

Citations

66

Authors

62

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

3

Authors

66

  1. JB
    Jean‐Pierre Benoît

    Inserm, France

    2 publications · 613 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. AN
    Abraham Neyman

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    2 publications · 130 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. DA
    Dilip Abreu

    Princeton University, United States

    2 publications · 1.7K citations

    2

    h-index

  4. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    2 publications · 43 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. GF
    Guillaume Fréchette

    New York University, United States

    2 publications · 162 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 66

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    8 publications · 671 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. Econometrica

    5 publications · 4.7K citations

    5

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 5 publications · 173 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 4 publications · 117 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. International Journal of Game Theory

    4 publications · 181 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5