Fictional Attitudes
Fictional Attitudes is a theoretical construct within the philosophy of mind and cognitive science that characterizes the mental states through which agents represent, reason about, or respond to propositions that are explicitly acknowledged as false or non-veridical within imagined, narrative, or pretense contexts, thereby distinguishing it from other propositional attitudes that typically aim at truth or belief-guided reality.
24
Publications
656
Citations
32
Authors
25
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
7
Parents
24
Ilkka Niiniluoto · Journal of Semantics · 1985 · 88 citations
Fictional Names in Psychologistic Semantics
Emar Maier · Theoretical Linguistics · 2017 · 81 citations · Full text
Imagination, Desire, and Rationality
Shannon Spaulding · The Journal of Philosophy · 2015 · 46 citations · Full text
1–5 of 24
32
2
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1 publications · 18 citations
1
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1
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1
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1–5 of 32
25
University of Kent
Canterbury, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
17 citations

University of Birmingham
Birmingham, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
19 citations

Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1 h-index
1 publications
40 citations
Université de Montréal
Montreal, Canada
1 h-index
1 publications
19 citations
Goethe University Frankfurt
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
26 citations

Birkbeck, University of London
London, United Kingdom
1 h-index
2 publications
46 citations

University of Manchester
Manchester, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
32 citations

University of Göttingen
Göttingen, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
26 citations
1–8 of 25
PPR · 2 publications · 22 citations
2
h-index
2 publications · 62 citations
2
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1 publications · 10 citations
1
h-index
1 publications · 46 citations
1
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1 publications · 35 citations
1
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1–5