Feedback Equilibrium

Feedback Equilibrium is a solution concept in dynamic games where strategies are functions of the current state of the system, characterized by each player's optimal policy contingent on the evolving state, such that no player can benefit from unilaterally deviating given the state-dependent strategies of others.

47

Publications

2.2K

Citations

93

Authors

62

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

17

Variants

Markov Perfect Equilibrium

Authors

93

  1. JE
    Jacob Engwerda

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    7 publications · 196 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. SS
    Suresh Sethi

    The University of Texas at Dallas, United States

    4 publications · 179 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. SC
    Sheung Chi Phillip Yam

    Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR China

    3 publications · 102 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. CC
    Chi Chung Siu

    University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR China

    3 publications · 102 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. GZ
    Georges Zaccour

    HEC Montréal, Canada

    3 publications · 119 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 93

Venues

  1. 5

    h-index

  2. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

    5 publications · 126 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. Automatica

    4 publications · 113 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. Production and Operations Management

    POMS · 3 publications · 148 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

    2 publications · 169 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5