Feedback Equilibrium
Feedback Equilibrium is a solution concept in dynamic games where strategies are functions of the current state of the system, characterized by each player's optimal policy contingent on the evolving state, such that no player can benefit from unilaterally deviating given the state-dependent strategies of others.
47
Publications
2.2K
Citations
93
Authors
62
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
17
Variants
Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Parents
47
Feedback equilibrium control during human standing
A.D. Alexandrov, AA. Frolov, F Horák et al. · Biological Cybernetics · 2005 · 284 citations · Full text
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Kent Smetters, Jan Walliser · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2001 · 86 citations
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Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR China
3 publications · 102 citations
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Tilburg University
Tilburg, The Netherlands
8 h-index
9 publications
374 citations

University of Hong Kong
Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong
4 h-index
4 publications
113 citations
The University of Texas at Dallas
Richardson, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
148 citations

Hang Seng University of Hong Kong
Shatin, Hong Kong
3 h-index
3 publications
102 citations
Group for Research in Decision Analysis
Montreal, Canada
3 h-index
5 publications
186 citations
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
3 h-index
5 publications
173 citations
HEC Montréal
Montreal, Canada
3 h-index
5 publications
186 citations
University of Bonn
Bonn, Germany
2 h-index
2 publications
55 citations
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5 publications · 276 citations
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5 publications · 126 citations
5
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4 publications · 113 citations
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POMS · 3 publications · 148 citations
3
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2 publications · 169 citations
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