Executive Compensation Clawbacks

Executive Compensation Clawbacks is a contractual mechanism that enables organizations to recover previously awarded compensation from executives subsequent to specific adverse events, such as financial restatements or misconduct, thereby distinguishing it from general forfeiture provisions by its retrospective and performance-contingent nature.

22

Publications

935

Citations

47

Authors

41

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

9

Authors

47

  1. FD
    Frank D. Hodge

    University of Washington, United States

    2 publications · 241 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. SH
    Sterling Huang

    Singapore Management University, Singapore

    2 publications · 63 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. TS
    Terry Shevlin

    University of California, Irvine, United States

    2 publications · 241 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. PY
    Paquita Y. Davis‐Friday

    University of Notre Dame, United States

    2 publications · 64 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. LG
    Lale Guler

    The University of Texas at Dallas, United States

    2 publications · 64 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 47

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 6 publications · 154 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. Contemporary Accounting Research

    CAR · 3 publications · 272 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. The Accounting Review

    3 publications · 217 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Corporate Governance An International Review

    2 publications · 53 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Financial Management

    FM · 1 publications · 14 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5