Executive Compensation Clawbacks
Executive Compensation Clawbacks is a contractual mechanism that enables organizations to recover previously awarded compensation from executives subsequent to specific adverse events, such as financial restatements or misconduct, thereby distinguishing it from general forfeiture provisions by its retrospective and performance-contingent nature.
22
Publications
935
Citations
47
Authors
41
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
9
Parents
22
Valuation Consequences of Clawback Provisions
Mai Iskandar‐Datta, Yonghong Jia · The Accounting Review · 2012 · 114 citations
1–5 of 22
47
2
h-index
2
h-index
2
h-index
2
h-index
2
h-index
1–5 of 47
41
Baruch College
New York, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
78 citations

Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
3 h-index
3 publications
137 citations
European Corporate Governance Institute
Brussels, Belgium
2 h-index
2 publications
30 citations
Singapore Management University
Singapore, Singapore
2 h-index
4 publications
126 citations
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
241 citations
The University of Texas at Dallas
Richardson, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
48 citations

University of Hong Kong
Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong
2 h-index
2 publications
33 citations

The University of Melbourne
Melbourne, Australia
2 h-index
2 publications
65 citations
1–8 of 41
Repository · 6 publications · 154 citations
6
h-index
CAR · 3 publications · 272 citations
3
h-index
3 publications · 217 citations
3
h-index
2 publications · 53 citations
2
h-index
FM · 1 publications · 14 citations
1
h-index
1–5