Executive Agency Influence is a theoretical construct within the study of executive branch lobbying that denotes the capacity of executive agencies to shape public policy outcomes through formal and informal advocacy, regulatory interpretation, and agenda-setting behaviors, distinguishing it from legislative or judicial influence by its administrative authority and implementation-focused mechanisms.
49
Publications
3.1K
Citations
75
Authors
46
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
5
Parents
Publications
49
1–5 of 49
Authors
75
- HM
2
h-index
- DE
2
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- ND
2
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- AM
2
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- MB
2
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1–5 of 75
Institutions
46
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
133 citations
Georgetown University
Washington, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
513 citations
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
334 citations
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
124 citations
California Southern University
Chandler, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
108 citations
Northern Kentucky University
Highland Heights, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
71 citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
548 citations
University of South Carolina
Columbia, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
71 citations
1–8 of 46
Venues
- Choice Reviews Online
CRO · 4 publications · 405 citations
4
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- American Journal of Political Science
AJPS · 3 publications · 467 citations
3
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- Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
JPART · 3 publications · 299 citations
3
h-index
- Legislative Studies Quarterly
2 publications · 123 citations
2
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- The Journal of Law Economics and Organization
LEO · 2 publications · 83 citations
2
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1–5