Evolutionary Stochastic Games
Evolutionary Stochastic Games is a theoretical framework within game theory that extends stochastic games by incorporating evolutionary dynamics, where the strategic interactions of agents in a population evolve over time under selection pressures induced by payoff-dependent replication or learning mechanisms.
331
Publications
23.8K
Citations
665
Authors
375
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
104
Parents
331
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
Martin A. Nowak, Robert M. May · Nature · 1992 · 4.5K citations
Social Sciences, Evolutionary Biology, Dynamical Systems +13
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics∗
Dean P. Foster, Peyton Young · Theoretical Population Biology · 1990 · 991 citations · Full text
L. S. Shapley · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 1953 · 652 citations
Lawrence E. Blume, David Easley · Journal of Economic Theory · 1992 · 575 citations
1–5 of 331
665
16
h-index
9
h-index
9
h-index
8
h-index
8
h-index
1–5 of 665
375
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
22 h-index
37 publications
6.9K citations
Evolutionary Genomics (United States)
Lafayette, United States
12 h-index
15 publications
3.5K citations

Peking University
Beijing, China
12 h-index
32 publications
2.6K citations

Chinese Academy of Sciences
Beijing, China
10 h-index
20 publications
597 citations
Wuhan University
Wuhan, China
10 h-index
22 publications
555 citations
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology
Plön, Germany
9 h-index
15 publications
1.2K citations
Wuhan University of Technology
Wuhan, China
8 h-index
16 publications
447 citations

University of Manchester
Manchester, United Kingdom
8 h-index
13 publications
600 citations
1–8 of 375
24 publications · 1K citations
18
h-index
PRE · 12 publications · 981 citations
12
h-index
13 publications · 296 citations
11
h-index
JET · 10 publications · 1.2K citations
10
h-index
9 publications · 306 citations
9
h-index
1–5