Evolutionary Stochastic Games

Evolutionary Stochastic Games is a theoretical framework within game theory that extends stochastic games by incorporating evolutionary dynamics, where the strategic interactions of agents in a population evolve over time under selection pressures induced by payoff-dependent replication or learning mechanisms.

331

Publications

23.8K

Citations

665

Authors

375

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

104

Authors

665

  1. MA
    Martin A. Nowak

    Harvard University, United States

    16 publications · 7.4K citations

    16

    h-index

  2. AT
    Arne Traulsen

    Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Germany

    9 publications · 1.9K citations

    9

    h-index

  3. XW
    Xianjia Wang

    Wuhan University, China

    9 publications · 234 citations

    9

    h-index

  4. LW
    Long Wang

    Peking University, China

    8 publications · 819 citations

    8

    h-index

  5. JQ
    Ji Quan

    Wuhan University of Technology, China

    8 publications · 208 citations

    8

    h-index

1–5 of 665

Venues

  1. Journal of Theoretical Biology

    24 publications · 1K citations

    18

    h-index

  2. Physical Review E

    PRE · 12 publications · 981 citations

    12

    h-index

  3. 11

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 10 publications · 1.2K citations

    10

    h-index

  5. Chaos Solitons & Fractals

    9 publications · 306 citations

    9

    h-index

1–5